Security
What is implemented, in plain terms, followed by what is not there yet.
| Area | How it works |
|---|---|
| Tenant isolation | Row-level security in PostgreSQL on every table. The application connects as a role without superuser or bypass rights; a query without an organization in scope returns nothing. |
| Connector direction | The connector calls out to GoEck Core. GoEck Core has no channel to run commands on your hosts and does not ask for one. |
| Connector identity | Each connector has its own 256-bit credential, sent over TLS and stored only as a hash. It can be revoked individually. |
| Passwords and sessions | Passwords are hashed with scrypt. Session tokens are stored as hashes, cookies are HttpOnly, and every state-changing request needs a per-session CSRF token. |
| Payments | Card data is entered on Stripe-hosted pages and never reaches GoEck Core. Stripe events are accepted only with a valid signature and applied once. |
| Plan enforcement | Limits are checked on the server from a versioned snapshot. An unknown feature or missing data resolves to denied. |
| Licenses | Self-hosted licenses are signed with Ed25519 and bound to a key generated on your installation. Only public keys leave the licensing service. |
| Audit trail | An append-only log records subscription changes, license events and support overrides with actor, time and reason. |
| Analytics | The website measures visits itself. No advertising or third-party tracker is loaded, and infrastructure data never enters marketing analytics. |
Not there yet
| Certificate-based connector identity | Planned. Connectors currently authenticate with a credential over TLS, not with a client certificate. |
|---|---|
| Independent audit or certification | None yet. We will say so here when there is one, with the report date. |
| Self-hosted control plane | License activation and validation are implemented and tested. The self-hosted deployment itself is not released for production use. |